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than large ﬁrms. We then develop a quantitative model where ﬁnancial frictions drive ﬁrm growth
and debt ﬁnancing through the availability of credit and default risk. We parameterize the model
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∗Arellano: arellano@econ.umn.edu; Bai: yan.bai@asu.edu; Zhang: jzhang@umich.edu. We thank V. V. Chari,
Chris House, Patrick Kehoe, Narayana Kocherlakota, Ed Prescott, Vincenzo Quadrini, and Richard Rogerson
for useful comments and suggestions. We thank Jacek Rothert for excellent research assistance. The views
expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
or the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
Financial restrictions can hinder ﬁrms’ ability to use inputs eﬃciently and aﬀect ﬁrm growth.
Recent theoretical models of ﬁrm dynamics predict that limited credit makes ineﬃcient small
ﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁrms.1 However, evidence for the magnitude of these eﬀects in
actual ﬁrm-level data is scarce. The central goal of this paper is to use cross-country variation
in ﬁnancial market development to evaluate empirically and quantitatively the impact of
ﬁnancial frictions on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices and growth rates with ﬁrm-level datasets.
We analyze the relations of ﬁrm size with growth and debt ﬁnancing using comprehensive
ﬁrm-level data from 22 European countries that vary in ﬁnancial market development. In
our analysis, we focus on the relative behavior of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes across countries
with varying ﬁnancial development, as indicated by the ratio of private credit to GDP and
the coverage of credit information for consumers and ﬁrms. Consistent with theories of
ﬁnancial frictions, we ﬁnd that small ﬁrms grow disproportionately faster than large ﬁrms
in less ﬁnancially developed countries. The growth rate diﬀerential across ﬁrms’ sizes and
countries is not only statistically signiﬁcant but also economically important. We ﬁnd that
a8 3p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t sd i ﬀerence in the ratio of credit to GDP (as found between the United
Kingdom and Finland) is associated with a 12 percentage points diﬀerence in growth rates
between ﬁrms with asset shares equal to 0.01 and 0.0001.
We also ﬁnd that small ﬁrms in less ﬁnancially developed countries ﬁnance their assets
with disproportionately less debt than large ﬁrms. Small ﬁrms tend to have higher leverage
ratios than large ﬁrms on average. But this diﬀerence shrinks or even reverses as ﬁnancial
market development worsens. The relation of the debt ﬁnancing patterns and ﬁnancial mar-
ket development is also economically sizable. For example, a 83 percentage points diﬀerence
in the ratio of credit to GDP is associated with a 5 percentage points diﬀerence in leverage
ratios across ﬁrms with asset shares equal to 0.01 and 0.0001. Importantly, all these ﬁndings
are robust to controlling for country, industry, or age-speciﬁc characteristics.
Our empirical contribution consists of providing a systematic cross-country investigation
of the interactions between ﬁnancial market development, ﬁrm size, debt ﬁnancing, and
growth with ﬁrm-level datasets that include a large number of small private ﬁrms across
multiple countries. The analysis focuses on the relative ﬁrm growth and ﬁnancing using an
extensive ﬁrm database covering many economies with varying ﬁnancial development. This
strategy allows us to identify more sharply the implications of ﬁnancial frictions because
we measure the additional eﬀect that ﬁnancial market development has on the diﬀerential
1Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Quadrini (2004), Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006), and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), among others.
2growth rate and debt ﬁnancing, after controlling for a large set of ﬁxed eﬀects. For additional
robustness of the results, we also include in the investigation measures that control for the two
other leading theories for ﬁrm dynamics, which are based on selection mechanisms and mean
reversion in the accumulation of factors of production. We ﬁnd that even after introducing
these controls, ﬁnancial considerations continue to play a prominent role in the dynamics of
ﬁrms.
In the second part of the paper, we develop a quantitative model of heterogeneous ﬁrms
where default risk interacts with ﬁrm growth and debt ﬁnancing. The model identiﬁes
the mechanisms that link ﬁrm growth to ﬁnancial conditions, and allows us to perform a
counterfactual exercise as well as a quantitative assessment of the theory. Credit restrictions
arise in our model because debt is unenforceable and ﬁrms can default. Lenders oﬀer ﬁrm-
speciﬁc debt schedules that compensate for default risk and for a ﬁxed credit cost they incur
when issuing debt. We proxy diﬀerences in ﬁnancial market development across economies
with diﬀerences in the ﬁxed credit cost. A high credit cost induces high default risk, which
in turn limits credit. The debt schedules restrict credit disproportionately for small ﬁrms in
less ﬁnancially developed economies and make their scale ineﬃcient. These small ﬁrms grow
faster because they can expand their scale. Hence, in the model small ﬁrms in less ﬁnancially
developed economies have less debt ﬁnancing and higher growth rates, as in the data.
The framework is a dynamic stochastic model where ﬁrms use a decreasing returns to
scale technology to transform capital into output and face uncertain productivity. They
ﬁnance capital and dividends with debt and proﬁts and have the option to default on their
debt. The restrictions on loans, due to default risk, impact ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing and capital
choices. Increasing debt is useful for ﬁnancing capital and dividends, but larger loans are
costly because of higher default risk. Hence, ﬁrms prefer to shrink their capital and become
ineﬃciently small to avoid excessively large loans. Firms can also be small simply because
the persistent component of their productivity is low.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc loan schedules determine their size and growth. Small unproductive
ﬁrms have high default risk and thus face restricted loans, especially in less ﬁnancially de-
veloped economies. Restricted credit makes them more likely to be ineﬃcient in scale and
hence to grow faster in response to good shocks because they use the additional output to
increase their scale to a more eﬃcient level. This implies that small ﬁrms grow faster in all
economies, and particularly fast in economies with high credit costs and high default risk.
Hence, our model matches the ﬁrst empirical regularity that small ﬁrms grow faster than
large ﬁrms especially in less ﬁnancially developed economies.
The debt ﬁnancing patterns across economies are determined by the ﬁrm-speciﬁcl o a n
schedules and also by the history of shocks. Unproductive small ﬁrms face the most restrictive
3schedules, which tend to lower their equilibrium level of debt. But ineﬃcient small ﬁrms have
larger loans due, as they have built up debt after a history of bad shocks. These dynamics
tend to increase the equilibrium level of debt of small ineﬃcient ﬁrms. Hence, small ﬁrms can
have higher or lower levels of debt than large ﬁrms. Nonetheless, as credit costs and default
risk increase, the restrictions on loan contracts become so severe for the small unproductive
ﬁrms that the level of debt of small versus large ﬁrms decreases. Thus, our model can match
the second empirical regularity that the diﬀerence in debt ﬁnancing of small and large ﬁrms
decreases in less ﬁnancially developed economies.
We quantitatively evaluate the model implications in rationalizing the cross-sectional
ﬁnancing and growth patterns jointly. We calibrate our model using the ﬁrm-level data of
Bulgaria and the United Kingdom as representative countries with weak and strong ﬁnancial
market development. Our calibration strategy consists of choosing the parameters capturing
the degree of debt enforceability to match the ﬁnancing patterns observed in the cross section
of ﬁrms in each country. The calibrated credit cost for Bulgaria equals 0.08% of output for
the average ﬁrm and restricts credit such that the average debt to asset ratio equals 0.60.
For the UK this cost is zero, which delivers a debt to asset ratio equal to 0.84. We then
evaluate the model’s predictions on growth rates for ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The model
replicates quantitatively the observed patterns of sales growth and ﬁrm size in the Bulgarian
calibration. For the UK calibration, the model delivers a substantial diﬀerence in growth
rates between small and large ﬁrms, though smaller than the data.
With our calibrated model economy, we perform two counterfactual experiments to quan-
tify how much of the diﬀerential growth and debt ﬁnancing for ﬁrms in Bulgaria and the UK
is due to the cross-country variation in ﬁnancial markets versus the productivity structure.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we oﬀer the UK ﬁnancial market development to ﬁrms in the Bul-
garian calibration. Consequently, the diﬀerence in growth rates between the small and large
ﬁrms decreases from 0.37 to 0.18 and the diﬀerence in leverage ratios increases from -0.21
to 0.09. Better ﬁnancial market development also increases the output of the small ﬁrms by
19%.
In the second experiment, we give the productivity and ﬁnancial market development
parameters of the UK calibration to ﬁrms in the Bulgarian calibration. We ﬁnd that the
diﬀerence in growth rates between small and large ﬁrms further decreases from 0.18 to 0.08,
while the diﬀerence in leverage ratios increases from 0.09 to 0.11. Nonetheless, diﬀerences
in productivity structure deliver diﬀerentials in growth rates and leverage ratios across ﬁrms
only because of the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. Hence, this experiment indicates that lack
of enforcement in debt contracts is especially costly in economies with volatile productivity,
as in Bulgaria.
4These two experiments show that the diﬀerential growth and leverage ratios across ﬁrms
and economies are largely driven by ﬁnancial factors: both cross-country diﬀerentials in
ﬁnancial markets and cross-country productivity diﬀerentials in the presence of default risk.
Related Literature
Our empirical ﬁn d i n g sa r en o v e lb e c a u s ew ea r et h eﬁrst to examine the cross-sectional
ﬁrm ﬁnancing and growth patterns simultaneously across countries with a broad coverage
of ﬁrms. In regard to growth, the cross-sectional ﬁrm-level analyses have considered only
one country, as in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for the United States.2 In regard to
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing patterns, cross-country comparisons have been studied only for large public
ﬁrms; Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine G7 countries, and Booth et al. (2001) study 10
developing countries. Public ﬁrms, however, constitute a small percentage of ﬁrms in all
countries, which limits the scope of these previous ﬁndings.3
The theoretical model is related to the literature that studies the implications of ﬁnancial
frictions on ﬁrm growth. Our theory is closest to Cooley and Quadrini (2001), who develop
am o d e lw h e r eﬁnancing restrictions arise from limited commitment in debt contracts. They
show that these frictions can potentially deliver large diﬀerences in the growth rates between
small and large ﬁrms. In our paper, we use ﬁrm-level data to quantify the extent to which
ﬁnancial considerations impact growth rates. We further concentrate on how diﬀerences in
ﬁnancial market development can explain ﬁrm ﬁnancing and growth patterns across coun-
tries. Our paper is also closely related to Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), who analyze
the eﬀects of enforcement problems under a full set of state-contingent assets. In our model,
we use incomplete markets to allow ﬁrms with a history of bad shocks to decrease their value
and to allow precautionary savings to play a role.4
Apart from ﬁnancial frictions, the two leading theoretical explanations for why small
ﬁrms grow faster are based on selection mechanisms and mean reversion in the accumulation
of factors of production. Hopenhayn (1992) and Luttmer (2007), for example, propose
theories where the growth of small ﬁrms reveals a selection eﬀect: small ﬁrms tend to exit
with bad shocks, and so they grow faster when they survive after good shocks. Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright (2007) develop a model where the mean reversion in the accumulation
of industry-speciﬁc human capital makes small ﬁrms grow faster. We view these theories as
complementary to the ﬁnancial frictions theory. In fact, we ﬁnd some empirical support for
2The cross-country analysis of growth has been restricted to industry-level data, as in Rajan and Zingales
(1998).
3For example, in the United Kingdom less than 2% of ﬁrms in our dataset are public ﬁrms.
4Quadrini (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) also study theo-
retically ﬁnancial constraints that arise due to informational asymmetries between lenders and entrepreneurs.
5these explanations. Nonetheless, theories of ﬁrm growth without ﬁnancial frictions are silent
(by construction) regarding the joint ﬁnancing and growth patterns of ﬁrms across countries.
The paper is also related to the literature in corporate ﬁnance on the capital structure
of ﬁrms.5 Hennessy and Whited (2005) develop a dynamic model of debt ﬁnancing and
show that progressive taxes induce larger ﬁrms to use more debt ﬁnancing. Interestingly,
this theory is at odds with the data in the United Kingdom where corporate taxes are
progressive, yet the relation between size and leverage is negative. Miao (2005) also studies
optimal capital structure of ﬁrms in a model with endogenous exit in response to productivity
shocks. In his model, ﬁrms choose debt only when they enter, yet small ﬁr m sh a v eh i g h e r
leverage ratios because their equity value is small. In our model, the ﬁrm’s debt choice is
time varying and the interest rate on debt reﬂects endogenous default probabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the new empirical ﬁndings
on ﬁrm growth and debt ﬁnancing across countries with varying ﬁnancial development. Sec-
tion 3 introduces and characterizes the model. Section 4 presents the quantitative assessment
of the model and counterfactual experiments. Section 5 concludes.
2E m p i r i c a l F a c t s
This section studies empirically the relation of ﬁrm size with debt ﬁnancing and growth
across countries. We use the cross-country variation in the development of their ﬁnancial
markets to identify the interaction of ﬁnancial frictions with debt ﬁnancing and ﬁrm growth.
We ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in debt ﬁnancing and growth across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes varies
systematically with the country’s ﬁnancial market development. Small ﬁrms use dispro-
portionately more debt ﬁnancing than large ﬁrms in more ﬁnancially developed countries.
And small ﬁrms grow disproportionately faster than large ﬁrms in less ﬁnancially developed
countries.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe the ﬁrm-level database, Amadeus, which we use for
the analysis of ﬁrms in Europe. We highlight our ﬁndings with two example countries: the
United Kingdom and Bulgaria. We then present our main empirical ﬁndings regarding the
debt ﬁnancing and growth patterns of ﬁr m si n2 2E u r o p e a nc o u n t r i e s .
2.1 Data Description
The data source is Amadeus, which is a comprehensive European database. Amadeus con-
tains ﬁnancial information of over 7 million private and public ﬁr m si n3 8E u r o p e a nc o u n t r i e s
5See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a comprehensive review.
6covering all sectors in the economy. Nonetheless, the coverage of Amadeus is limited for some
countries. Given our aim to document ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing and growth patterns for a comprehen-
sive and representative sample of ﬁrms, we need to select the countries for which Amadeus
contains a suﬃciently large number of ﬁrms.
We ﬁrst exclude countries that do not require private ﬁrms to report their balance sheets.
We next use a simple criterion to select the countries that have a ratio of the number of
ﬁrms reporting positive assets to PPP-adjusted GDP larger than 20% of the ratio for the
United Kingdom in 2005. The dataset for the United Kingdom in AMADEUS is especially
attractive because it contains the largest number of ﬁrms by far relative to all the other
countries. These criteria leave us with 22 countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom.6 In the appendix we show that the datasets for these 22 countries
are in fact quite comparable and representative of the universe as reported by the European
Commission.
We examine the ﬁrms’ balance sheet data for these 22 countries in 2004 and 2005. Firm
size is measured by the book value of the total assets of the ﬁrm. To measure debt ﬁnancing,
we compute the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio in 2005. Leverage is deﬁned as the broad measure of
total liabilities over total assets of the ﬁrm. We use this broad deﬁnition because it is a more
consistent measure across countries and because it provides the largest sample of ﬁrms. Firm
growth is measured by the net real growth rate of sales from 2004 to 2005, adjusted by the
C P Ii ne a c hc o u n t r y . W ee x c l u d eﬁrms in the ﬁnancial and government sectors following
Rajan and Zingales (1995). We also clean the data by restricting the sample to ﬁrms that
report positive assets and non-negative liabilities each year. For the growth statistics, we
further restrict the sample to ﬁrms that also report positive sales in both 2004 and 2005.
Finally, we remove ﬁrms with outlier observations of growth and leverage in the top 1st
percentile.7
The development of ﬁnancial markets in these 22 countries is measured using two statis-
tics. The ﬁrst one is the average private credit to GDP ratio over 2000—2004 taken from the
World Development Indicators. Higher ratios of private credit to GDP indicate better ﬁnan-
cial development. The second measure is the coverage of credit registries. Credit registries
in countries track the loans and defaults of individuals and ﬁrms and facilitate lending by
banks and ﬁnancial institutions. The statistic we use is the percentage of adults that are
6The threshold of 20% is not important. If we use a threshold of 15%, only Slovak is added to the sample
of countries.
7The appendix contains more details about the data cleaning procedure.
7included in the public and private credit registries in 2005 in each country.8 Larger credit
bureau coverage indicates better ﬁnancial development because it implies that it is easier
for ﬁnancial intermediaries to make loans when credit information of borrowers is available.
Credit bureau coverage is taken from the Doing Business publications of the World Bank.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm-level datasets and the two measures
of ﬁnancial markets development for each country. Countries are ordered by their level of
private credit to GDP. The table shows the variability of ﬁnancial development is large across
these 22 countries. For example, the private credit to GDP ratio is 143% in the Netherlands
and only 18% in Russia; the credit bureau coverage is 100% in Sweden and 0% in Croatia.
As expected, these two ﬁnancial development indices are highly correlated in our sample
with a correlation of 0.64.
Table 1: Summary of Firm-Level Datasets and Financial Development
Firm-Level Datasets Financial Development
Mean Median Mean Mean No. Credit Credit
Asset Asset Leverage Growth Firms Coverage (%) to GDP (%)
Denmark 5909 365 0.58 0.16 116726 7.7 147
Netherlands 13791 523 0.92 0.11 147754 68.9 143
United Kingdom 13269 86 0.84 0.11 846910 76.2 143
Portugal 2750 159 0.80 0.12 198162 63.7 138
Iceland 3295 129 0.91 0.59 16528 100 120
Ireland 7588 202 0.91 0.18 86736 100 116
Spain 5023 405 0.75 0.26 526455 42.1 109
Malta 11186 887 0.75 0.33 1749 – 108
Sweden 6496 197 0.62 0.18 192240 100 91
France 5102 215 0.74 0.09 802371 1.8 87
Norway 5020 261 0.78 0.26 144400 100 83
Italy 5247 650 0.81 0.12 528374 59.9 81
Belgium 4000 236 0.74 0.07 290332 55.3 75
Finland 4933 153 0.56 0.16 73556 14.7 60
Croatia 4729 318 0.66 0.04 18942 0.00 48
Czech Republic 3664 168 0.76 0.32 57302 24.9 37
Latvia 3068 576 0.71 0.43 4596 0.6 34
Estonia 585 34 0.42 0.54 50326 12.5 29
Bulgaria 2227 86 0.65 0.53 29731 13.6 22
Lithuania 4273 622 0.61 0.58 6006 4.4 19
Russia 4671 73 0.79 0.63 163628 0.0 18
Romania 307 16 0.98 0.46 419251 1.4 11
The mean and median level of assets for ﬁrms in each country are reported for 2005 in
8We use data for 2005 because this statistic is not available for many countries before 2005.
8terms of current euros in the table. Firm asset levels vary across countries, and they tend
to be larger in countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, the distribution
of ﬁrms in all countries is highly skewed, as the mean asset levels are much larger than the
median asset levels. We also report the average leverage ratio and the average growth rate
across all ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r y . B o t hm e a nl e v e r a g ea n dm e a ng r o w t hv a r ys u b s t a n t i a l l y
across countries. The mean leverage ratio is 0.92 in the Netherlands, but only 0.42 in Estonia;
the mean net growth rate is 11% in the Netherlands, but 54% in Estonia. The table also
reports the number of ﬁrms with positive assets and liabilities in the dataset of each country.
Overall, these aggregate statistics are systematically related to ﬁnancial market develop-
ment. First, ﬁrms in countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets tend to have larger
leverage ratios. The cross-country correlation of mean leverage and the private credit to
GDP ratio is 0.31, and the correlation of mean leverage and the credit bureau coverage is
0.43. Second, ﬁrm growth is on average smaller in countries with better ﬁnancial develop-
ment. The cross-country correlation of mean growth and the private credit to GDP ratio is
-0.58, and the correlation of mean growth and the credit bureau coverage is -0.29. Third,
ﬁrms in countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets are larger. The correlation of the
mean asset level and private credit to GDP equals 0.65, and the correlation of the mean
asset level and credit coverage is 0.44.
2.2 Example: United Kingdom and Bulgaria
To provide a stark illustration of our main empirical ﬁndings, we analyze two example
countries that diﬀer substantially in their ﬁnancial market development: the United Kingdom
and Bulgaria. Let’s ﬁrst consider the unconditional relation of leverage and ﬁrm size in
Bulgaria and in the United Kingdom. To this end, we divide ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r yi n t o
10 quantiles according to their assets and compute their leverage ratios. Figure 1 plots the
mean leverage ratio of ﬁrms in each quantile in Bulgaria and the UK for the year 2005. The
ﬁgure illustrates the remarkably distinct pattern of size and leverage across countries. In
the UK the leverage-size relation is generally downward sloping: small ﬁrms have relatively
higher leverage ratios than large ﬁrms. In particular, the mean leverage ratio of the smallest
ﬁrms is above 1 and that of the largest ﬁr m si s0 . 6 6 . 9 In Bulgaria, the diﬀerence in leverage
ratios between small and large ﬁrms shrinks, and in fact the leverage-size relation is generally
increasing, ranging from 0.35 for the smallest ﬁrms to 0.69 for the largest ﬁrms.10
9When leverage is greater than 1, ﬁrms have negative equity. Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2008)
document that 21% of the small ﬁrms in the United States have negative equity in 1998.
10In an earlier version of this paper, we documented that in Ecuador, which has a degree of ﬁnancial
development similar to that in Bulgaria, small ﬁrms have lower leverage ratios than large ﬁrms, as we













Figure 1: Firm Size and Leverage
The relation between ﬁrm size and ﬁrm growth is also diﬀerent across these two countries.
To analyze the unconditional relation of growth and size, we again divide ﬁrms in each
country into 10 quantiles according to their assets in 2004 and compute average sales growth
from 2004 to 2005 for each quantile. Figure 2 reports the mean sales growth rate for ﬁrms in
each asset quantile in Bulgaria and in the UK. The ﬁgure illustrates that small ﬁrms grow
faster than large ﬁr m si nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .T h ed i ﬀerence in growth rates of small and large
ﬁrms, however, is bigger in Bulgaria than in the UK. Small British ﬁrms in the ﬁrst asset
quantile grow at the rate of 54%, whereas large British ﬁrms in the tenth asset quantile grow
at the rate close to zero. Small Bulgarian ﬁrms, however, grow at the rate of 157%, while
large Bulgarian ﬁrms grow at about 12%.
Our ﬁndings for the UK and Bulgaria suggest that the size-growth and size-ﬁnancing
patterns are related to the development of the ﬁnancial market in each country. To estab-
lish these observations for a broad country sample, we start by analyzing the unconditional
relations of ﬁrm size with growth and leverage for all sample countries. In every country we
divide ﬁrms into asset quintiles according to their assets, and for every quintile we compute
mean growth and mean leverage. Table 2 reports these statistics. We ﬁnd that across these
22 European countries, small ﬁrms have, on average, higher leverage ratios and higher growth
rates than large ﬁrms. We then look at the unconditional correlations of the diﬀerence in
growth rates and leverage ratios of ﬁrms in the smallest quintile and in the largest quintile
with ﬁnancial development across countries. The correlations of the growth diﬀerence with
private credit to GDP and the credit coverage equal -0.63 and -0.41, respectively. The corre-
















Figure 2: Firm Size and Sales Growth
equal 0.42. These unconditional correlations conﬁrm the unconditional patterns observed in
the UK and Bulgaria. In the next subsection, we further examine these relations using a
detailed set of controls and for comprehensive ﬁrm-level datasets.
2.3 Cross-Country Empirical Findings
Our hypothesis is that in countries with more developed ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e t s ,s m a l lﬁrms have
higher leverage ratios and lower growth rates relative to large ﬁrms. Therefore, we pool all
the countries together and estimate two regressions of the following forms:
Leverage(or Growth)=0 + 1 log(Asset Share) (1)
+2 log(Asset Share)×Financial Development+Dummy Variables+,
where  denotes the country, and  the ﬁrm. The dependent variable is the ﬁrm’s leverage
ratio for the leverage regressions and the ﬁrm’s real sales growth rate for the growth regres-
sions. Asset Share is the share of the ﬁrm ’s assets in the total assets of country .G i v e n
the highly skewed ﬁrm size distribution, we use the log of ﬁrms’ asset shares as ﬁrm size.
Financial Development corresponds to the two measures of ﬁnancial development in coun-
try  namely, private credit over GDP and coverage of credit registries. The term Dummy
Variables corresponds to ﬁxed eﬀects at the country × industry × age level. Hence, the
regression gives each country × industry × age group an independent intercept.
The regression speciﬁcation controls for country-speciﬁce ﬀects, 2-digit industry-speciﬁc
eﬀects, and 7 age-group-speciﬁce ﬀects. Country eﬀects control for any country characteristic,
11Table 2: Unconditional Leverage and Growth across Asset Quintiles
Leverage Growth
Asset Quintiles Asset Quintiles
12345 12345
B e l g i u m 0 . 9 80 . 6 90 . 6 80 . 6 70 . 6 6 0 . 1 30 . 0 50 . 0 50 . 0 50 . 0 5
Bulgaria 0.45 0.63 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.39
Croatia 0.63 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08
Czech Rep 0.89 0.87 0.76 0.69 0.58 0.66 0.36 0.25 0.17 0.17
D e n m a r k 0 . 5 40 . 6 00 . 5 90 . 5 80 . 5 8 0 . 2 50 . 1 30 . 1 10 . 1 50 . 1 7
E s t o n i a 0 . 1 50 . 4 00 . 5 00 . 5 30 . 5 4 0 . 8 80 . 5 60 . 4 50 . 3 70 . 4 3
F i n l a n d 0 . 5 10 . 5 80 . 5 70 . 5 60 . 5 6 0 . 2 60 . 1 50 . 1 20 . 1 20 . 1 3
France 0.86 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
I c e l a n d 1 . 1 01 . 0 00 . 8 80 . 8 30 . 7 4 0 . 9 10 . 5 50 . 3 60 . 5 00 . 6 1
I r e l a n d 1 . 5 40 . 9 50 . 7 60 . 6 60 . 6 3 0 . 2 40 . 2 00 . 1 70 . 1 50 . 1 6
I t a l y 0 . 7 90 . 8 30 . 8 30 . 8 10 . 7 7 0 . 1 60 . 1 40 . 1 10 . 0 90 . 0 8
Latvia 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.78 0.42 0.27 0.33 0.34
L i t h u a n i a 0 . 6 50 . 6 40 . 6 10 . 5 90 . 5 8 1 . 4 60 . 5 00 . 3 60 . 3 10 . 2 9
M a l t a 1 . 0 10 . 7 70 . 7 20 . 6 60 . 6 1 0 . 5 70 . 3 50 . 3 40 . 1 30 . 2 6
Netherlands 1.38 0.95 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.20 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.10
Norway 0.86 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.70 0.44 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.21
Portugal 0.94 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08
R o m a n i a 1 . 3 21 . 0 50 . 9 10 . 8 10 . 7 7 0 . 8 40 . 5 70 . 4 20 . 2 50 . 1 8
R u s s i a 0 . 8 80 . 8 50 . 7 80 . 7 40 . 6 9 1 . 0 90 . 7 80 . 5 90 . 3 60 . 3 4
Spain 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.45 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.25
Sweden 0.56 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17
UK 1.18 0.87 0.79 0.71 0.66 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.05
A v e r a g e 0 . 8 90 . 7 60 . 7 20 . 6 90 . 6 6 0 . 5 10 . 3 00 . 2 30 . 2 00 . 2 1
for instance, business cycles, institutional quality, the legal system, the political system,
and many others. Industry eﬀects are at the 2-digit level constructed with NACE codes.
They control for any inherent features of industries, including capital intensity, competition
structure, liquidity needs, and tradability. The 7 age groups are constructed at 5-year
i n t e r v a l su pt o3 0y e a r sa n daﬁnal group for ﬁrms with age greater than 30 years. Age eﬀects
control for any inherent life cycle features of ﬁrms, such as market share and technological
development.
As discussed in Rajan and Zingales (1998), the use of ﬁxed eﬀects enables us to control
for a much wider array of omitted variables. These dummy variables will capture the pe-
culiar features of each age group within each sector of each country, such as the particular
technological characteristics or speciﬁc tax treatments varying at the country × industry
× age level. Only additional explanatory variables that vary within each of the industry-
country-age groups need be included. These are ﬁrm size and the primary variable of interest,
12the interaction between ﬁrm size and ﬁnancial market development. According to our hy-
pothesis, we must ﬁnd the coeﬃcient estimate for the interaction between size and ﬁnancial
development to be negative in the leverage regression and to be positive in the growth re-
gression.
Table 3 reports the regression results using the two measures of ﬁnancial development.
The ﬁrst two columns report the leverage regressions, and the last two columns report
the growth regressions. For the regressions using coverage of credit registries, we drop
Malta because this statistic is not available for this country. We report the coeﬃcient on
ﬁrm size and the coeﬃcient on the interaction term between ﬁrm size and ﬁnancial market
development in the table. The standard errors of the regression coeﬃcients are reported in
parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity throughout the paper.
Table 3: Firms’ Leverage, Growth, and Financial Development
Leverage Growth
Private Credit Credit Bureau Private Credit Credit Bureau
to GDP Coverage to GDP Coverage
Size (log(ﬁrm’s -0.039∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
asset share)) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Interaction (credit -0.012∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
to GDP × size) (0.0003) (0.0007)
Interaction (credit bureau -0.016∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
coverage × size) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Age
Adjusted 2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Number observations 4564461 4563685 2568782 2568559
Number of groups 4773 4662 4550 4486
Let’s start with the regression that analyzes the size-leverage relation. The estimated
coeﬃcient on the interaction variable is negative as expected and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level under both measures of ﬁnancial market development. The coeﬃcient estimate
on size is also negative and statistically signiﬁcant under both measures. Thus, smaller ﬁrms
have on average higher leverage ratios than large ﬁrms, other things being equal. Moreover,
when private credit to GDP or credit bureau coverage increases, the leverage ratios of small
ﬁrms relative to large ﬁrms increase.
The interaction term is similar to a second derivative. To interpret its magnitude, let’s
look at the regression with private credit to GDP and compare a small ﬁrm with an asset
13share equal to 0.001% to a large ﬁrm with an asset share equal to 1% in Bulgaria and the
United Kingdom. The leverage diﬀerence between these comparable small and large ﬁrms is
6.7 percentage points higher in the UK than in Bulgaria, as private credit to GDP is higher
in the UK by 121 percentage points. These numbers are economically signiﬁcant given that
the mean leverage ratio for Bulgaria equals 0.65.
Let’s now look at the regressions that analyze the size-growth relation. Size continues
to be a signiﬁcant determinant; smaller ﬁrms grow faster overall. The estimated coeﬃcients
on the interaction term are positive as expected and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level
for both measures of ﬁnancial development. That is, the growth diﬀerence between small
and large ﬁrms decreases with both private credit to GDP and credit bureau coverage. We
can interpret the coeﬃcient on the interaction of private credit to GDP and size as follows.
The diﬀerence in growth rates of a small ﬁrm with an asset share equal to 0.001% relative
t oal a r g eﬁrm with an asset share equal to 1% is 17 percentage points less in the United
Kingdom than in Bulgaria.
2.4 Robustness Tests
In this section we perform robustness on the main results by considering alternative explana-
tions for the negative relation between ﬁr ms i z ea n dg r o w t hi na d d i t i o nt oﬁnancial frictions.
One important theoretical explanation of the growth-size relation is the selection theory:
small ﬁrms are more likely to exit under adverse shocks and thus tend to have higher growth
rates conditional on survival. If selection diﬀers across countries, one concern is whether
our results are robust when we control for such variation. Unfortunately, our dataset does
n o th a v ep r e c i s ei n f o r m a t i o no nﬁrm exit. Nevertheless, we proxy the degree of selection by
the mean growth rate of ﬁrms in each country because this theory implies that average ﬁrm
growth should be higher in countries where selection is more important. Speciﬁcally, we add
an interaction term between ﬁrm size and mean growth to the main regressions. The results
are reported in Table 4 .
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the interaction between ﬁr ms i z ea n dm e a ng r o w t hi ss i g -
niﬁcantly negative as expected by the selection theory. However, even after we control for
selection, the coeﬃcients of the interaction between ﬁrm size and ﬁnancial market develop-
ment continue to be signiﬁcant and positive as in the main regressions. That is, small ﬁrms
tend to grow relatively faster than large ﬁrms in less ﬁnancially developed countries.11
In a recent work, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) propose another theory for the
relation between ﬁrm size and growth based mean reversion in the accumulation of factors.
11We also examine the sample attrition issue and ﬁnd that the size-attrition relation is uncorrelated with
ﬁnancial development. For details, see the appendix.
14Table 4: Robustness on the Growth Regression
Private Credit to GDP Credit Bureau Coverage
Size (log(ﬁrm’s -0.017∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006
asset share)) (0.0009) (0.005) (0.0005) (0.004)
Interaction (Financial 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Development × size) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Interaction (Mean -0.084∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
growth × size) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0006)
Interaction (Industry No Yes No Yes
× size)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Age
Adjusted 2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Number observations 2568782 2568782 2638072 2638072
Number of groups
In their model the growth diﬀerence between small and large ﬁr m si sl a r g e ri ns e c t o r st h a t
use physical capital more intensively. They also document that in the United States, the
growth rate of ﬁrms declines faster with size in the manufacturing sector than in the service
sector. To control for the industry eﬀect on the size-growth relation, we add an additional
interaction term between ﬁrm size and two-digit industry categories to the main regressions
in addition to the interaction between size and mean growth. With this added interaction
variable we allow the relation of size with growth to be industry dependent. As shown in
Table 4, the main regression results remain almost unchanged for both measures of ﬁnancial
development.
We also conduct similar robustness tests on the leverage regressions. The results are
reported in Table 5. The estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction terms of ﬁrm size and
private credit to GDP have the same sign and the same signiﬁcance under all of these
alternative speciﬁcations as in the main regressions. The same is true for the estimated
coeﬃcients on the interaction of ﬁrm size and credit bureau coverage.
Finally, we add two additional interaction terms: the interactions of ﬁrm size with the
seven age groups and with the country’s GDP per capita. These variables allow for the
relation of size with growth to be age dependent and to vary with the log of the country’s
GDP per capita. We ﬁnd that our main results are robust to adding these two additional
interaction terms. We also conduct robustness checks by using employment as an alternative
m e a s u r eo fs i z ea n dﬁnd that the main results are unchanged. All these details are reported
15Table 5: Robustness on the Leverage Regression
Private Credit to GDP Credit Bureau Coverage
Size (log(ﬁrm’s -0.030∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
asset share)) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.002)
Interaction (Financial -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
Development × size) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Interaction (Mean -0.023∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
growth × size) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Interaction (Industry No Yes No Yes
× size)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Age
Adjusted 2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Number observations 4564461 4564461 4563685 4563685
in the appendix.
In summary, we ﬁnd that small ﬁrms use less debt ﬁnancing and grow disproportionately
faster than large ﬁrms in countries with worse credit bureau coverage and lower ratios of
private credit to GDP. These empirical ﬁndings are important for providing a comprehensive
picture of the relations of ﬁnancial market development with ﬁnancing and growth across
ﬁrms and across countries.
3M o d e l E c o n o m y
To study theoretically ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices and dynamics, this section presents a dynamic
model of heterogeneous ﬁrms that face default risk. The model builds on Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) while incorporating diﬀerentiation across
economies in the development of their ﬁnancial markets. In the model, entrepreneurs decide
on the level of capital and debt ﬁnancing for their ﬁrms. Credit restrictions arise because
debt is unenforceable and ﬁrms can default. Lenders oﬀer ﬁrm-speciﬁc debt schedules that
compensate for default risk and for a ﬁxed credit cost they incur when issuing debt. We
proxy ﬁnancial market development with credit cost because large costs induce high default
risk, which limits the economy-wide credit.
163.1 Firms
Entrepreneurs in the economy are inﬁnitely lived and have access to a mass one of risky
project opportunities, which we refer to as ﬁrms. Each entrepreneur owns at most one ﬁrm
and decides on entry, exit, production, and ﬁnancing plans to maximize the present value of
dividends.
An operating ﬁrm starts the period with capital  and debt . It produces output with
a stochastic decreasing returns technology with capital as input:  = ,w h e r e0 1
and the productivity of the project  follows a Markov process given by (0).I tﬁnances
the new capital 0 and dividends  with internal funds which consist of the ﬁrm’s output
n e to fd e b tr e p a y m e n t −  and with external funds by acquiring a new loan 0.W e
deﬁne the leverage of this ﬁrm as the ratio of total debt due to capital installed  if
 ≥ 0 If the ﬁrm starts with assets   0,t h eﬁrm has no liabilities due, and thus its
leverage ratio is equal to zero.
The timing of decision for an operating ﬁrm within the period is as follows. At the
beginning of the period,  fraction of ﬁrms exit exogenously. All surviving ﬁrms receive their
shocks. An entrepreneur with debt , capital ,a n ds h o c k decides whether or not to
default. If the entrepreneur repays his debt, he chooses a new loan, capital for the following
period, and dividends. If the entrepreneur defaults, the ﬁrm exits.
We lay out the recursive formulation for the entrepreneur operating a ﬁrm. Upon ob-
serving the shock realization, the entrepreneur decides whether to default by comparing the
default value   with the repayment value  :





where  () denotes the present value of the ﬁrm to the entrepreneur. The entrepre-
neur’s default decision can be represented by a binary variable () that equals 1 if
default is chosen and 0 if repayment is chosen.
If the entrepreneur chooses to default, his debt is written oﬀ, but he loses the project.
We assume that with probability  the entrepreneur can start a new project with the same




where  () denotes the value of a potential entrant with productivity .
If the entrepreneur repays his debt, he keeps his project in operation and decides on
production and ﬁnancing. Given the set of loan contracts, the entrepreneur chooses the
17amount to be received from the creditor this period 0 and the amount to be repaid the
following period 0
 conditional on not defaulting, capital 0, and dividends  to maximize
the repayment value:

()= m a x
{00
0}





subject to a non-negative dividend condition given by
 = 
 −  + 
0 − 
0 ≥ 0 (4)
where 1 denotes the discount rate of the entrepreneur.  () is increasing in 
and decreasing in  and  () is independent of these variables. Thus, default is more
attractive for ﬁrms with smaller capital and larger debt due.
Optimal debt is determined by trading oﬀ costs and beneﬁts of various loans within
the set of contracts oﬀered. Debt is beneﬁcial for ﬁnancing investment. Debt can also be
used for dividends, which is attractive when loans are cheap and entrepreneurs discount the
future heavily. In addition, debt can be used to relax the non-negative dividend condition
when the ﬁrm’s output is low and the loan due is large. On the other hand, large debt is
costly because it can lead ﬁrms to default. In particular, a large loan today implies a large
repayment the next period that will be costly especially when the productivity shock is low.
In this case, income might be so low that the entrepreneur fails to satisfy the non-negative
dividend condition, defaults, and loses the project. In anticipation of these possible adverse
outcomes, the entrepreneur might have precautionary motives to reduce debt and save.12
In our model with limited enforceability of debt contracts, ﬁnancing decisions interact
with ﬁrms’ investment. In contrast, in an environment where non-contingent contracts are
perfectly enforceable and the non-negative dividend condition is relaxed, ﬁrms choose capital
such that the expected marginal product of capital equals the risk-free rate:
()()
−1 =( 1+) (5)
We refer to this level of capital () as ﬁrst-best capital for a ﬁrm with expected produc-
tivity equal to ().
With enforcement frictions, investment also depends on the set of loan contracts available.
In particular, investment is distorted downward. For example, if a ﬁrm starts with large debt,
12Contrary to Cooley and Quadrini (2001), our model does not impose that debt is used for capital only,
which adds a lower and an upper bound on debt. This feature gives more room for the precautionary savings
usage and allows a better match of the data where many ﬁr m sh a v en e g a t i v ee q u i t y .
18it might want to borrow a big loan 0 to satisfy the non-negative dividend condition and
to keep the investment level at the unconstrained optimal. Nonetheless, given that the set
of loans is bounded due to possible defaults, such a big loan might not be oﬀered to the
entrepreneur. Hence, the entrepreneur might have to reduce the level of investment, making
the project ineﬃciently small.
The problem for a potential entrant is simple in this model. Whenever an idle entrepre-
neur receives a project opportunity of productivity , he decides to undertake the project
and enter if the expected value of the project is positive. Thus, the value for a potential
entrant is given by

()=m a x {0
(00)}
Note that the new entrant starts with no assets and thus the value conditional on entering
is exactly equal to the value of the contract  (00) when  and  are equal to zero.
3.2 Loan Contracts
In the model, ﬁnancial frictions are embodied in the schedule of loan contracts that ﬁrms
face. The schedule of potential loans that ﬁrms choose from in turn depends on their default
decisions. A loan contract (000
) speciﬁes that a ﬁrm with productivity  receives
0 from the creditors the current period, pays back 0
 the next period conditional on not
defaulting, and invests 0.13 In addition, creditors have to pay a ﬁxed credit cost  for every
loan they oﬀer. Debt schedules include all contracts that allow creditors to break even in
expected value such that:

















0  0 (6)
The left-hand side of equation (6) are the resources creditors spend today. The right-hand
side is the expected repayment discounted by the risk-free rate and the death shock.
Default risk determines the availability and the terms of debt contracts. If a ﬁrm that
invests 0 and has productivity  wants a larger transfer 0 today, it will need to promise
an increasingly larger repayment tomorrow  because of higher default risk. Moreover, for
every 0 and  the schedule contains an upper bound ¯ 0 , which is associated with excessively
high default risk, that limits the possible ﬁrm’s borrowings. However, ﬁrms can improve the
availability and terms of their loans by choosing a higher investment 0 Increasing capital
13We generalize the endogenous debt schedules developed in Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Arellano (2008)
in their study of unsecure consumer credit and sovereign default by adding an interaction of capital and
default risk in the study of ﬁrm dynamics.
19makes ﬁrms less likely to default and hence allows for larger and more favorable loans.14
T h ec r e d i tc o s t aﬀects the availability of debt through its impact on default risk. In
particular, a high credit cost increases the risk of default by raising the costs of ﬁnancing.
Higher aggregate default risk in turn limits the economy-wide availability of credit. However,
t h ei m p a c to fc r e d i tc o s t s on ﬁrm-speciﬁc default risk also depends on the ﬁrm’s level of
capital and productivity. In general, high  increases default risk disproportionately for ﬁrms
with low capital and productivity.
One can rationalize the expense of  as costs lenders pay to obtain information about the
entrepreneur’s total debt. Knowing this information is necessary for the lender to correctly
assess the probability of default of each entrepreneur. We interpret  as the economy’s ease
to acquire credit information, and it controls ﬁnancial market development of the model
economy. The parameter  can be naturally linked to the coverage of credit registries across
countries as well as the aggregate level of credit. When  is low, credit registries in the
economy have wide coverage, and it is very easy and cheap to access credit information.
When  is large, the lender has to spend some resources to screen the entrepreneur and
obtain his debt information.15 As documented in the empirical section, the coverage of
credit registries across countries varies widely, and this variable is linked to the ways ﬁrms
grow and ﬁnance their assets. Thus, our model focuses on variation in  to capture diﬀerences
in ﬁnancial market development across economies.
Entrepreneurs in our model can also save 0  0 We assume that when the entrepreneur
saves creditors do not need to pay  as default probabilities are zero. Savings contracts








0 ≤ 0 (7)
3.3 Equilibrium
Before deﬁning the equilibrium of this economy, we make an assumption on the relation
between the risk-free rate and the discount factor of entrepreneurs. The assumption imposes
that the rate at which entrepreneurs discount the future is higher than the risk-free rate.
This condition can be interpreted as a general equilibrium property of economies with lack
14Our model shares this additional beneﬁt of capital of relaxing borrowing constraints with many models
of collateral constraints such as Kyotaki and Moore (1997) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
15This speciﬁcation of credit issuance costs is similar to the one used in Livshits, MacGee, and Ter-
tilt (2008). They document that improvements in credit scoring in the United States are important for
understanding the rise in bankruptcies and volume of debt.
20of enforcement and incomplete markets.16
Assumption 1 The risk-free rate  is such that 1 − 1 0.
The model delivers an endogenous distribution of ﬁrms, denoted by Υ(),w h i c hd e -
pends on the decisions of ﬁrms to borrow and invest. Whenever existing ﬁrms exit either
exogenously or endogenously, their  projects become available to potential entrant entre-
preneurs such that the mass of projects is always equal to one. New entrants start their




[(1 − )()+]Υ()d( × )



















0))Υ()d( ×  × ) (8)
where (·) denotes a transition function that maps current states into future states. The
distribution of ﬁrms the following period includes the set of surviving ﬁrms that do not
default and do not receive the death shock. It also includes the new ﬁrms that enter after
project opportunities from the exiting ﬁr m sb e c o m ea v a i l a b l e .
The recursive equilibrium for this economy consists of the policy and value functions of
ﬁrms, the loan contracts oﬀered by creditors, and the distribution of ﬁrms such that (i) given
t h es c h e d u l eo fl o a nc o n t r a c t so ﬀered, the policy and value functions of ﬁrms satisfy their
optimization problem; (ii) loan contracts reﬂect the ﬁrm’s default probabilities such that
with every contract creditors break even in expected value; (iii) the distribution of ﬁrms
follows (8) and is consistent with the policy functions of ﬁrms and shocks given the initial
distribution Υ0.
3.4 Borrowing Limits and Financial Development
Limited enforceability of debt contracts generates endogenous borrowing limits for ﬁrms
because creditors do not provide loans that will be defaulted on in all future states. These
16If (1 + )=1 , ﬁrms strictly prefer to accumulate assets rather than distribute dividends because of
the additional beneﬁts of assets in terms of avoiding ﬁrm failure. This would generate an excessive supply
of loans that would in turn drive down the risk-free rate.
21borrowing constraints play a key role in determining optimal debt. Moreover, borrowing
limits vary across ﬁrms and with ﬁnancial market development. In particular, weak ﬁnancial
development limits borrowing relative to assets. And this limitation is more severe for small
ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms.
We provide an analytical characterization of these ﬁndings by considering the case when
ﬁrms are heterogeneous with respect to  yet this productivity is constant over the ﬁrm’s
lifetime. In addition, for simplicity we assume that ﬁrms do not face the death shock ( =0 ).
We also impose an assumption on credit costs. This assumption guarantees that ﬁrms have
an incentive to borrow to the limit every period. It also ensures that the borrowing limit is
at least as large as the ﬁrst best level of capital for all ﬁrms.







When productivity is certain and constant over time, ﬁrms will either repay or default with
probability one on any loan. Thus, there is no equilibrium default, as loans that will be
defaulted upon with probability one are not oﬀered. Hence, loan contracts available are
oﬀered at the risk-free rate. Let () denote the borrowing limit of a ﬁrm with productivity
 and ()=( 1+)(()+) denote the associated debt repayment limit.
The assets of the ﬁrm are equal to the level of capital (), which is constant over
time at the ﬁrst best level, as its return is equalized in equilibrium to the constant return
on bonds. Also the ﬁrm wants to borrow to the limits given (1 + )  1. Hence, the value
of a new entrant ﬁrm with productivity  is given by

(00)=[ () − ()] + [()
 − () − () − (1 + )](1 − )
The value of any existing ﬁrm with productivity  and debt repayment () is given by

(()())=[ ()
 − () − () − (1 + )](1 − )
The borrowing limit for a ﬁrm with productivity  is the level of debt that makes the




Hence, we derive the debt limit as
()=1() − 2 (9)
22where both 1 and 2 are positive.17 More productive and larger ﬁrms (bigger )h a v el o o s e r
borrowing limits than small ﬁrms, independent of the degree of ﬁnancial market development.
Also, stronger ﬁnancial market development (lower ) increases the loan availability for all
ﬁrms, independent of productivity.







The relation between debt limits to assets and size is aﬀected by the economy’s ﬁnancial
development or easiness to acquire credit information, . When credit information is free
( =0 ), all ﬁrms face the same borrowing limits relative to assets. This is because the
problem is homogeneous with respect to . When credit costs are large (0), small ﬁrms
are constrained in their borrowing relative to large ﬁrms because the credit cost increases
default risk disproportionately for them. Moreover, the disadvantage of small ﬁr m sr e l a t i v et o
large ﬁrms becomes more pronounced as  increases. The following proposition summarizes
this ﬁnding.
Proposition 1. In the case without uncertainty,  =0 , and under assumptions 1 and 2,





Proof. Direct diﬀerentiation of equation (10) delivers the result.
Deriving analytical expressions for debt limits in the case with uncertain productivities is
diﬃcult due to lack of analytical solutions for the ﬁrm’s decision rules of debt and invest-
ment. All the results regarding borrowing limits, sizes, and ﬁnancial market development,
however, carry through when we solve numerically the model for the more general case with
uncertainty.
4 Quantitative Implications of the Model
We now assess quantitatively how default risk shapes ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing and growth. We
calibrate the model to two representative countries, Bulgaria and the United Kingdom. The
171 =
[(1+−)(1−)+(1−)(1+)]
((1−)+(1−)) and 2 =
(1+)(1−)
((1−)+(1−)).
23important parameters that capture ﬁnancial frictions are calibrated to obtain the ﬁnancing
patterns observed in the cross section of ﬁrms in each country. We then ﬁnd that default risk
can quantitatively account for the relation of ﬁrm size with growth found in each country.
Improving ﬁnancial markets in the model reduces the diﬀerence in both growth rates and
leverage ratios of small versus large ﬁrms, which makes the model fully consistent with the
empirical evidence. Better ﬁnancial markets also increase signiﬁcantly the output of small
ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that lack of contract enforcement is especially detrimental for ﬁrms in
economies with more volatile productivity shocks.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model twice to match Bulgarian and British data in 2005. The following
parameters are chosen independently of the model equilibrium. The interest rate  is set to
4% per annum for Bulgaria and 2% per annum for the UK, which corresponds to the real
interest rates in these countries from IFS.18 The decreasing returns parameter  is chosen to
be 0.90, following Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). The probability of re-accessing credit markets
after default  is set to 0.10 following Chatterjee et al. (2007) so that the average number
of years that defaulters are excluded from credit markets equals 10 years.
All other parameters are calibrated jointly such that our model produces relevant mo-
ments of Bulgarian and British ﬁrm datasets. We assume that ﬁrms’ idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity consists of a permanent component  and an i.i.d. component  such that the
productivity for ﬁrm  equals 
 = 
 · 
 To make the distribution of ﬁrms in our model
tractable, we choose a ﬁnite number of  and  to parameterize the distribution of produc-





} and that  can take
two values { }.E a c h  is assumed to have equal mass. Without loss of generality,
we assume that transitory shocks have a mean of one, and thus the low shock  and its






  } to match the following 10 moments in the data:
the median asset levels of ﬁve asset quintiles in each country, the average real sales growth
rate from 2004 to 2005 of 53% in Bulgaria and 11% in the UK, the average coeﬃcient of
variation for sales across ﬁrms of 0.40 in Bulgaria and 0.3 in the UK, the mean leverage ratio
of 0.65 in Bulgaria and 0.84 in the UK, the leverage ratio of ﬁrms in the ﬁr s ta s s e tq u i n t i l eo f
0.45 in Bulgaria and 1.18 in the UK, and the mean age of ﬁrms of 10 years across countries
in Europe.19 Table 6 summarizes all the parameter values in the calibration.
18The real interest rate is constructed as the diﬀerence between the annual nominal lending rate and the
inﬂation rate.
19The coeﬃcient of variation for sales is computed from the detrended time series of real sales of each
24Table 6: Parameter Values in Benchmark Calibrations
Parameter Bulgaria United Kingdom Target
Interest rate  0.04 0.02 Annual real interest rate
Re-entry prob.  0.10 0.10 Chatterjee et al (2007)









Temporary prod.   0.21, 1.13 0.48, 1.08 Mean CV sales
 0.145 0.13 Mean sales growth rate
Death rate  0.08 0.08 Mean age of ﬁrms
Credit cost  0.03 0.0 Leverage for 1st asset quintile
Discount factor  0.94 0.96 Mean leverage
The calibrated  parameter for Bulgaria equals 0.03, which corresponds to 0.08% of
output for the average ﬁrm. The credit costs are higher for the smallest ﬁrms and equal
4.3% of the output of ﬁrms in the ﬁrst asset quintile. The calibrated  parameter for the
UK equals zero.20
4.2 Debt Schedules and Dynamics
Before presenting the quantitative results, it is informative to understand how default risk
aﬀects ﬁrms’ debt schedules and how these restrictions on credit impact ﬁrms’ choices of
debt, capital, and dividends.
Let’s start by looking at the equilibrium debt schedules (000
) that arise due to
default risk. The left panel of Figure 3 shows that debt schedules are more lenient if ﬁrms
choose larger capital levels. The panel plots the possible pairs (00
) (relative to the ﬁrst
best capital as in eq. 5) for two ﬁrms with mean productivity 1
 and capital choice equal
to 100% and 80% of the ﬁrst best level. The slope of the schedule equals (1 − )(1 + )
when  ranges from 0.02 to about 0.4.21 For larger  values, the ﬁrm defaults in the low
shock the following period; the slope of the schedule in this range is (1−)(1−)(1+)
For even larger  values, the ﬁrm defaults with probability one, and thus these contracts
are not oﬀered in equilibrium. Default risk not only increases the eﬀe c t i v ei n t e r e s tr a t ep a i d
on loans, but also generates borrowing limits. Importantly, these limits are increasing in the
capital choice of the ﬁrm. As shown in the ﬁgure, the maximum transfer 0 that the ﬁrm
can get is 1.20 if the ﬁrm chooses capital equal to the ﬁrst best or 1 if capital is 20% lower.
ﬁrm for 2000—2005.
20In the calibration we restrict  to be non-negative, and for the UK this constraint is binding.
21The schedule doesn’t start at the origin due to the ﬁxed cost.
25Figure 3: Debt Schedules
Debt schedules are also more lenient for ﬁrms with higher productivity. The right panel
of Figure 3 plots the possible pairs (00
) (relative to their corresponding ﬁr s tb e s tc a p i t a l
levels) for two ﬁr m sw i t hm e a np r o d u c t i v i t y1
 and 3
 when capital 0 equals (
).
As in Proposition 1 for the deterministic case, ﬁrms with higher productivity default for
disproportionately higher levels of debt. Hence, they can borrow relatively larger loans at
both risk free rates and risky rates.
The limitations on debt contracts aﬀect the way ﬁrms respond to shocks. When expe-
riencing sequences of bad shocks, ﬁrms tend to reduce their scale to maintain non-negative
dividends and increase their debt ﬁnancing, climbing up their debt schedules. When ex-
periencing a good shock, these ineﬃcient ﬁrms expand their scale and reduce their debt,
sliding down their debt schedules. These dynamics imply that ﬁrms with the same perma-
nent productivity display diﬀerent sizes that depend on the history of shocks. Across these
ﬁrms, ineﬃciently small ﬁrms tend to have higher growth rates and higher leverage ratios.
To illustrate these dynamics, consider the decision rules for a ﬁrm with median permanent
productivity 3
 in the Bulgarian calibration shown in Figure 4.
Optimal policies depend on the permanent component of productivity and a single
endogenous state variable: cash on hand, which equals output minus debt repayment,
−. Cash on hand encodes the information regarding the ﬁrm’s history of transitory
shocks and it is low when ﬁrms have a low productivity shock, large debt due, and small
capital. In Figure 4 we plot the optimal capital choice, dividends, and debt relative to the
26Figure 4: Policy Rules
capital choice as a function of cash on hand. We report capital, dividends, and cash on hand
relative to the ﬁr s tb e s tc a p i t a lf o rt h i sﬁrm.
W i t hl a r g ec a s ho nh a n d ,t h eﬁrm invests a constrained eﬃcient level, distributes divi-
dends, and holds a low level of debt. The low debt level is due to a precautionary motive,
similarly as in standard precautionary savings models (Aiyagari 1994 and Huggett 1993).
With uncertainty the ﬁrm may not ﬁnd it optimal to exhaust its borrowing opportunities
because large debt increases the likelihood of ﬁrm failure. Thus, the ﬁr mh a si n c e n t i v e st o
reduce its debt to this low level whenever possible under good transitory shocks.
With intermediate levels of cash on hand, the ﬁrm stops paying dividends, and tends to
increase debt and decrease investment. Although larger capital choices allow ﬁrms to face
more lenient debt schedules, large capital choices might also require ﬁrms to choose larger
loans, such that dividends remain non-negative. The non-monotonicities in the capital choice
reﬂect precisely this trade-oﬀ.H o w e v e r , o v e r a l l w e ﬁnd that as the ﬁrm’s cash on hand
decreases, the choice of capital is lower to prevent debt from increasing too rapidly. All
else equal, smaller loans are beneﬁcial to avoid future default, which is costly because the
expected value of keeping the project is large.
W i t hl o wl e v e l so fc a s ho nh a n d ,t h eﬁrm has very large debt to repay and ﬁnds it no
longer optimal to avoid default. In anticipation of default under the low shock the following
period, the ﬁrm chooses high debt and adjusts investment to a more appropriate scale for
the high shock only.22
22The jump in investment in the default region of Figure 4 is an artifact of our two discretized transitory
shocks.
27Firm size depends on its permanent productivity and also its history of transitory shocks.
A ﬁrm is small either because it has a low level of permanent productivity (unproductive)o r
b e c a u s ei th a sas e q u e n c eo fb a ds h o c k s( unlucky). The diﬀerent reasons why ﬁrms are small
have diﬀerent ﬁnancing implications. Unproductive small ﬁrms tend to have low debt to asset
ratios given their restrictive loan schedules. Unlucky small ﬁrms, however, tend to have high
debt to asset ratios as a result of the bad shocks. But both unlucky and unproductive small
ﬁrms tend to have ineﬃcient scales because either they are closer to their borrowing limits
or have restrictive debt schedules. These small ﬁrms have high growth rates when hit with
good shocks, as these shocks alleviate their needs of credit and they can expand their size
to a more eﬃcient level.
4.3 Main Quantitative Results
Let’s now examine the model’s main quantitative results. We compute and simulate the
model twice: one under the Bulgarian calibration and one under the British calibration. In
each simulation, we obtain a model economy with 15,000 ﬁrms over 500 periods. The model
delivers in the long run a cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms, which we use to compute
the model’s statistics. For each period, we divide the cross section of ﬁrms into ﬁve asset
quintiles. In the model, ﬁrm size equals the assets of the ﬁrm: capital  plus savings  if
  0. We compute for every asset quintile and for the entire distribution of ﬁrms, average
sales growth rates, leverage ratios, and median asset levels. The model results are reported
in Table 7, together with the data statistics.
The table shows that the Bulgarian calibration matches successfully the target moments
in the data. In particular, the model reproduces the median asset in each asset quintile, the
average sales growth, the mean leverage ratios of the whole sample and of the ﬁrst asset
quintile. The UK calibration matches the median assets, the average leverage and sales
growth, but produces a leverage ratio of the ﬁrst asset quintile lower than that in the data,
0.95 versus 1.18.23
We now evaluate the model implications on the size-growth and size-ﬁnancing patterns.
The model under the Bulgarian calibration generates a negative size-growth relation that
matches the data well. The growth rates for the smallest and largest ﬁrms are 77% and 40%,
respectively, in the model, close to 73% and 39%, respectively, in the data. The model also
generates an increasing leverage pattern ranging from 0.47 for the smallest ﬁrms to 0.68 for
the largest ﬁrms, similarly as in the data.
The quantitative implications are less successful under the British calibration. The model
23This feature is mainly due to the restriction that the ﬁxed credit cost  be non-negative.
28Table 7: Main Quantitative Model Results
Bulgaria Data Model
Quintile Assets Growth Lev. Assets Growth Lev.
1 1 0.73 0.45 1 0.77 0.47
2 5 0.51 0.63 5 0.56 0.62
3 12 0.51 0.72 13 0.46 0.60
4 38 0.49 0.73 40 0.48 0.62
5 198 0.39 0.71 202 0.40 0.68
Mean 51 0.53 0.65 52 0.53 0.60
U.K. Data Model
Quintile Assets Growth Lev. Assets Growth Lev.
1 1 0.23 1.18 1 0.17 0.95
2 5 0.13 0.87 4 0.09 0.79
3 17 0.05 0.79 14 0.10 0.82
4 66 0.07 0.71 71 0.10 0.82
5 508 0.05 0.66 516 0.08 0.80
Mean 120 0.11 0.84 121 0.11 0.84
delivers a negative size-leverage relation and a negative size-growth relation, but the overall
ﬁt is less tight than that under the Bulgarian calibration. Speciﬁcally, the growth rate
declines from 0.17 for the smallest ﬁrms to 0.08 for the largest ﬁrms in the model, while the
growth rate declines from 0.23 to 0.05 in the data. The leverage ratio for the largest ﬁrms is
0.80 in the model, but 0.66 in the data.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc debt schedules and the ﬁrm’s position on its debt schedule drive these
results. In the Bulgarian calibration, the overall results are driven by the variation in debt
schedules across ﬁrms with diﬀerent permanent productivity as the majority of ﬁrms in asset
quintile  have permanent productivity 
 T h eu n p r o d u c t i v es m a l lﬁrms in economies with
weak ﬁnancial markets have disproportionately restrictive debt schedules, which induces
these ﬁrms to have low leverage ratios and high growth rates. The model under the British
calibration is homogeneous across permanent productivity as  =0  and thus the overall
results are driven by the unlucky ﬁrms who have climbed up their debt schedules. In this
calibration, the majority of ﬁrms in asset quintile  also have permanent productivity 
;
however, we ﬁnd that a larger fraction of ﬁrms with higher permanent productivity end up in
lower asset quintiles. Firms in this economy have better borrowing opportunities to sustain
a longer sequence of bad shocks without defaulting while becoming ineﬃciently small. For
example, there are 98% of ﬁrms with permanent productivity 1
 in the ﬁrst asset quintile
in the Bulgarian calibration and 94% of ﬁrms with productivity 1
 in this quintile in the
British calibration. The small unlucky ﬁrms have higher debt to asset ratios and also higher
growth rates, and hence the model can match the size-growth and size-leverage patterns of
29the British economy.24
Our model is also consistent with several other empirical predictions. First, the model
predicts that ﬁrms who default have larger leverage ratios than continuing ﬁrms. This
implication is consistent with Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2006), who ﬁnd that the
leverage ratios of failing public ﬁrms in the United States are larger than those of continuing
ﬁrms. The Bulgarian calibration generates a default rate of 1.8% every period, and a mean
leverage ratio of 1.78 for these defaulting ﬁrms, compared with 0.58 for continuing ﬁrms. The
British calibration also delivers larger leverage ratios for defaulting ﬁrms than for continuing
ﬁrms, 1.87 versus 0.83. In this calibration, 1% of ﬁrms default every period.
Second, the model predicts that large ﬁrms are the ones that distribute dividends, which
is consistent with U.S. data as documented in Fazzari et al. (1988). In the Bulgarian
calibration, 75% of ﬁrms in the ﬁrst asset quintile do not pay any dividends, compared to
62% for ﬁrms in the ﬁfth asset quintile. In the UK calibration, 61% of ﬁrms in the ﬁrst
asset quintile do not pay any dividends, compared to 52% for ﬁrms in the ﬁfth asset quintile.
We also note that ﬁrms in economies with better ﬁnancial markets are more likely to pay
dividends. Paying dividends more often is intrinsically related to a lower precautionary
motive for ﬁrms in economies with larger loan availability.
Our results demonstrate that ﬁnancial frictions can rationalize quantitatively the growth-
size relation observed in both Bulgaria and the UK, though the ﬁti st i g h t e rf o rB u l g a r i a
than for the UK. These exercises are revealing because we use the ﬁnancial variables of
ﬁrms to discipline the extent to which the growth-size relation can be attributed to ﬁnancial
imperfections. By parameterizing the model to mirror the debt ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms,
we ﬁnd that the model delivers quantitatively the growth-size relation in the data.
4.4 Counterfactuals
We now use our calibrated model to perform two counterfactual experiments. We want to
quantify how much of the diﬀerential growth rate and debt ﬁnancing for ﬁrms in Bulgaria
and the UK is due to the cross-country variation in ﬁnancial frictions versus the productiv-
ity structure. We ﬁnd that country-speciﬁc ﬁnancial frictions are most important for the
diﬀerential leverage ratios and growth rates across ﬁrms. Removing ﬁnancial frictions also
increases output especially for the small ﬁrms. The country-speciﬁc productivity structure
also contributes modestly toward the leverage-size and growth-size patterns in an environ-
ment with default risk. We ﬁnd that lack of enforcement in debt contracts is especially
24The intrinsic positive comovement of growth rates and leverage ratios present in our model with zero
credit costs is similar to the one analyzed by Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004), and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007).
30damaging for economies with a more volatile productivity structure.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we lower the ﬁx e dc r e d i tc o s tt oz e r o ,w h i l ek e e p i n gt h er e m a i n i n g
parameters of the Bulgaria calibration unchanged. These results are presented in the second
panel of Table 8, where asset levels are normalized to the mean asset level in the ﬁrst
quintile under the Bulgaria benchmark calibration. In this experiment, the size-leverage
relation becomes negative, and the size-growth relation becomes ﬂatter. In particular, the
diﬀerence in growth rates between the smallest and largest ﬁrms declines from 37% to 15%,
and the diﬀerence in leverage ratios increases from -21% to 9%. Also, lowering credit costs
increases the mean leverage from 60% to 73%, and decreases the mean growth rate from
53% to 49%. All these implications are fully consistent with our empirical ﬁndings.
Table 8: Counterfactual Experiments
UK credit cost and
Bulgaria benchmark UK credit costs productivity structure
Quintile Assets Growth Lev. Assets Growth Lev. Assets Growth Lev.
1 1 0.77 0.47 1.2 0.56 0.77 0.9 0.17 0.92
2 5 0.56 0.62 5.2 0.55 0.79 3.3 0.11 0.83
3 13 0.46 0.60 13 0.51 0.71 13 0.11 0.82
4 40 0.48 0.62 41 0.41 0.68 62 0.11 0.84
5 202 0.40 0.68 211 0.41 0.70 458 0.09 0.81
Mean 52 0.53 0.60 54 0.49 0.73 107 0.12 0.84
Improved ﬁnancial markets also impact the output of ﬁrms. When the ﬁxed credit cost is
lowered from 0.03 to zero, the average output rises by 19% for ﬁrms in the ﬁrst asset quintile
and by 1.5% for ﬁrms in the ﬁfth asset quintile.25 In our model, the impact of ﬁnancial
market development on aggregate output is modest because aggregate statistics are driven
mainly by the large ﬁrms. However, one potential additional channel that default risk can
aﬀect aggregate output is through its impact on ﬁrm entry. Firms start to operate when
their value is larger than zero. High ﬁxed credit costs reduce the value of ﬁrms such that
ﬁrms enter only when their productivity is high enough. This results in fewer operating ﬁrms
and lower output in less ﬁnancially developed countries.
For the second experiment, we maintain the zero ﬁxed credit cost and change the pro-
ductivity structure (both permanent and transitory) to the one calibrated for the UK ﬁrm
dataset. These results are presented in the third panel of Table 8. In this model economy,
the diﬀerence in growth rates between the smallest and largest ﬁrms further decreases from
15% to 8%, and the diﬀerence in leverage ratios further increases from 9% to 11%.
25All asset levels in Table 8 are normalized to the mean asset level of ﬁrms in the ﬁrst quintile of the
Bulgarian benchmark.
31Changing the productivity structure has a modest eﬀect on the diﬀerences in growth
rates and leverage ratios across economies and ﬁrms relative to changing ﬁnancial market
development. But in this second experiment, it is the presence of ﬁnancial frictions that
allows productivity diﬀerences across economies to change the diﬀerential growth rates of
small and large ﬁrms in the model. If debt contracts were perfectly enforceable, all pro-
ductivity structures would deliver a ﬂat growth-size relation. We ﬁnd that economies with
higher volatility, as in the second panel of Table 8, are disproportionately aﬀected by the
lack of contract enforcement and default risk. Changing the productivity structure alone
does have an substantial impact for the mean ﬁrm growth, as seen in Table 8.
These two experiments reveal that the diﬀerential growth and leverage ratios across
ﬁrms and economies are mostly driven by ﬁnancial factors: both cross-country diﬀerentials
in ﬁnancial markets and cross-country productivity diﬀerentials in the presence of default
risk.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have studied both empirically and theoretically the growth and debt ﬁnancing patterns
of ﬁrms across countries. Using a broad and comprehensive ﬁrm-level database from 22
European countries, we documented that in less ﬁnancially developed countries – countries
with low private credit to GDP ratios or limited credit bureau coverage – small ﬁrms grow
faster and use less debt ﬁnancing than large ﬁrms. These ﬁndings are robust to controlling
for age, sector, and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Our empirical analysis provided a new picture of
the relation of ﬁnancial market development with debt ﬁnancing and growth across ﬁrms
and countries.
We then developed a quantitative dynamic model of heterogeneous ﬁrms where ﬁnan-
cial development aﬀects ﬁrm ﬁnancing and growth through the availability to credit. By
calibrating the degree of ﬁnancial development to the observed debt ﬁnancing patterns of
ﬁrms, we assessed the model implications on ﬁrm growth. We found that ﬁnancial market
development is important in explaining quantitatively the diﬀerence in growth rates across
ﬁrms and across countries.
A contribution of the paper is to use micro ﬁrm-level data in a quantitative model to
study the growth and ﬁnancing patterns in the cross section of ﬁrms of multiple countries. A
natural next step is to analyze a time dimension by introducing aggregate ﬂuctuations in the
model to study the cyclical features of ﬁrm dynamics. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009)
document that for the United States, the variance in the ﬁrm size distribution is procyclical,
32and the early phases of booms are mainly driven by the expansion of small ﬁrms. Our
framework can prove useful in analyzing the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on the cyclical
cross-sectional ﬁrm dynamics. More generally, we view our quantitative methodology that
combines ﬁrm-level data with theory as a useful tool for analyzing the interaction of micro
decisions with macro implications.
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Empirical Appendix
In this appendix, we ﬁrst examine the comparability of the country samples. We then
describe in detail the procedure for cleaning the data in the regressions. Finally, we present
additional robustness of the main empirical regressions.
Comparability of Country Samples
This section analyzes the coverage and comparability of the AMADEUS dataset across coun-
tries. The European Commission Report contains information on the distribution of the
universe of ﬁrms in the business sector for most of the countries in our sample. They report
the percentage of enterprises that have 1 to 9 employees, 10—49 employees, 50—250 employ-
ees, and over 250 employees. Hence, we compare the fraction of ﬁrms for each employment
category in our dataset with that in the universe from the report.26
Unfortunately, the employment information is not reported for every ﬁrm in AMADEUS.
The lack of employment data can be a severe problem for some countries. For example, in the
Netherlands only 65% of ﬁrms in the business sector that report assets and liabilities report
employment. Moreover, this lack of employment information is the most severe for small
ﬁrms. Hence, we impute employment measures for ﬁrms that do not report employment
in AMADEUS. To do this, we run regressions country by country of log(employment) on
log(assets) and log(liabilities). The ﬁt of these regressions is good, with  squares above 0.6
for all countries.27 We then impute employment for the ﬁrms that do not report it using the
estimated coeﬃcients and their assets and liabilities.
Table 9 reports the ﬁrm distribution in AMADEUS and in the universe for countries for
which we have data. The table shows that in our sample, the majority of ﬁrms are small
with only 1 to 9 employees (micro ﬁrms) as in the data. In our sample, on average 70%
of ﬁrms are micro ﬁrms, whereas in the universe of ﬁrms, 89% are micro. In our sample,
only about 1% of ﬁrms have more than 250 employees, which is consistent with the universe
where less than 1% of ﬁrms fall into this category. Importantly, the coverage in AMADEUS
is similar across countries, with most countries having micro ﬁrms between 60% and 80%.
26For this comparison, we include only ﬁrms in sectors that correspond to the business sectors in the
European Commission Report.
27Introducing additional controls such as ﬁrm age and sector dummies changes the ﬁt of the regressions
only marginally.
36Table 9: Coverage and Comparability of Country Datasets
AMADEUS Dataset European Commission — Universe
Micro Small Medium Large Micro Small Medium Large
1-9 10-49 50-250 250 1-9 10-49 50-250 250
Belgium 0.895 0.087 0.014 0.004
Bulgaria 0.689 0.233 0.062 0.016 0.902 0.08 0.016 0.002
Croatia 0.625 0.264 0.089 0.022
Czech Rep 0.601 0.269 0.106 0.024 0.953 0.038 0.008 0.001
Denmark 0.765 0.189 0.037 0.009 0.869 0.109 0.019 0.003
Estonia 0.788 0.179 0.029 0.004 0.815 0.151 0.03 0.004
Finland 0.797 0.160 0.033 0.010 0.924 0.061 0.012 0.003
France 0.810 0.156 0.027 0.006 0.923 0.064 0.01 0.003
Iceland 0.911 0.083 0.005 0.001
Ireland 0.736 0.236 0.025 0.002
Italy 0.695 0.264 0.034 0.007 0.946 0.048 0.005 0.001
Latvia 0.317 0.408 0.229 0.046 0.831 0.139 0.027 0.003
Lithuania 0.270 0.444 0.250 0.035 0.755 0.197 0.043 0.005
Malta
Netherlands 0.750 0.198 0.040 0.012 0.89 0.091 0.016 0.003
Norway 0.795 0.182 0.020 0.003
Portugal 0.773 0.196 0.028 0.004
Romania 0.875 0.098 0.023 0.005 0.881 0.09 0.023 0.006
Russia 0.314 0.485 0.164 0.037
Spain 0.727 0.238 0.030 0.006 0.923 0.068 0.008 0.001
Sweden 0.819 0.144 0.030 0.007 0.947 0.043 0.008 0.002
UK 0.755 0.190 0.040 0.015 0.864 0.114 0.018 0.004
Average 0.700 0.224 0.063 0.013 0.887 0.091 0.017 0.003
Data Cleaning Procedure
In this section, we describe the detailed procedures in assembling the cross-country datasets
analyzed in the empirical section. In particular, we present step-by-step data cleaning pro-
cedures, construction methods of all the variables, and data sources for the country-level
statistics.
Firm Data
We download the data from the AMADEUS database compiled by Bureau Van Dijk Elec-
tronic Publishing. We delete all ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial and government sectors which cor-
respond to NACE codes 65, 66, 67, and 75. We delete ﬁr m st h a th a v eo n eo rm o r eo f
the following characteristics: missing total assets, non-positive total assets, missing total
liabilities, and negative liabilities.
37For the leverage regressions, we gener a t et h el e v e r a g ev a r i a b l ef o re a c hﬁrm by taking
the ratio of the ﬁrm’s total liabilities to total assets. We drop the outlier ﬁrms with leverage
ratios in the top 1st percentile of the leverage distribution in each country. We generate the
Asset Share variable by dividing the ﬁrm assets by the sum of total assets in its country.
We generate the interaction variables by multiplying log(Asset Share) by the corresponding
variables of interest such as private credit to GDP or credit coverage.
For the growth regressions, we follow these additional steps. We drop the ﬁrms with
missing, zero, or negative operating revenue (or sales) in 2004 and 2005. We generate the
real growth variable as
operating revenue05 ∗ exchange rate depreciation0504
operating revenue04 ∗ CPI inﬂation0504
− 1
We drop outlier ﬁrms with growth rates in the top 1st percentile of the growth distribution
in each country. For this new clean sample, we generate the log(Asset Share) variable and
the interaction variables as described above for the leverage regressions.
For both regressions, we construct dummy variables for age groups. Firms are classiﬁed
into 7 age groups based on the ﬁrm age in terms of years: [05) [510) [1015) [1520)
[2025) [2530)[30∞)
Country Data
The country-level statistics are obtained from various data sources. Private credit to GDP
from 2000 to 2004 is from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Credit bu-
reau coverage in 2005 is from Doing Business 2006 published by the World Bank. Exchange
rates, deﬁned as local currency per euro, and CPI inﬂation from 2004 to 2005 are from the
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.
Robustness of the Main Regressions
This section analyzes the robustness of the cross-country regression results presented in Ta-
bles 3, 5, and 4. We ﬁrst present robustness checks on the sample attrition. We then consider
employment as an alternative ﬁrm size measure. Finally, we consider adding additional inter-
actions of size with age and GDP per capita. We ﬁnd that the results of the main regressions
are maintained under these alternative speciﬁcations.
38Sample Attrition
In our analysis we considered the growth rate of ﬁrms conditional on being in the sample
in both periods 2004 and 2005. Even though sample attrition is actually very small in
the growth regressions (1% on average), a potential concern for our results is whether the
interaction coeﬃcients on size and ﬁnancial market development might be capturing a higher
sample attrition for small ﬁrms in less ﬁnancially developed countries. However, we ﬁnd that
sample attrition is uncorrelated with both measures of ﬁnancial market development, and
hence our main growth results are not driven by diﬀerential size-attrition patterns across
countries.
In particular, we compute the sample attrition rate for each asset quartile in each country.
We then pool the quartile sample attrition rates for all countries and regress these attrition
rates against the asset quartiles and the interaction variables of size (quartile) by ﬁnancial
market development. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the size categories and an
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction between size and ﬁnancial development. Hence,
small ﬁrms in the ﬁrst asset quartile have higher sample attrition on average across all
countries, but the diﬀerential attrition rates across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes is uncorrelated
with the country’s ﬁnancial market development.
Employment as Firm Size
Table 10 reports four leverage and growth regressions where ﬁrm size is deﬁned by employ-
ment. Employment is either the actual number of employees reported by each ﬁrm or the
imputed employment measure constructed in the section of the comparability of the country
samples. The share of employment of a ﬁrm equals the ratio of its employment to the total
employment in its country. The sample is the same as that in the main regressions, with
the exception of the ﬁrms that do not report employment and at the same time have zero
liabilities. We exclude these ﬁrms when imputing their employment.
The results show that using employment as an alternative measure of ﬁrm size does not
change our main conclusions. Small ﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁrms and use less debt
ﬁnancing in less ﬁnancially developed countries. The interaction coeﬃcients in the four
regressions have signs as expected and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Additional Interactions: Size with Age and GDP Per Capita
We now conduct additional robustness tests of the leverage and growth regressions by adding
two additional variables: the interactions of ﬁrm size with the seven age groups and with the
country’s GDP per capita. By doing so, we allow the relation of size with growth and leverage
39Table 10: Robustness: Employment as Size
Leverage Growth
Private Credit Credit Bureau Private Credit Credit Bureau
to GDP Coverage to GDP Coverage
Size (log(employment share)) -0.015∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Interaction (credit to GDP -0.012∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
× size) (0.004) (0.001)
Interaction (credit bureau -0.020∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
coverage × size) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Age
Adjusted 2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Number Observations 4459799 4459799 2553490 2553490
to be age dependent and to vary with the log of the country’s GDP per capita. For both the
leverage and growth regressions with either measure of ﬁnancial development, we add these
two interaction terms. Table 11 shows that in the leverage regressions, the coeﬃcient on the
interaction of ﬁrm size and private credit to GDP or credit bureau coverage remains negative
and signiﬁcant when adding the interactions of ﬁrm size with age and with the country’s per
capita GDP. Table 11 shows that in the growth regressions, the coeﬃcient on the interaction
of ﬁrm size and private credit to GDP remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant with
these two additional interaction variables. The table also shows that the coeﬃcient on the
interaction of ﬁrm size and credit bureau coverage remains positive and signiﬁcant when
the additional age interaction is introduced. This coeﬃcient, however, becomes insigniﬁcant
when we add the interaction of ﬁrm size and GDP per capita.
40Table 11: Robustness on Growth Regression: Industry, Age, and GDP Per Capita Interac-
tions
Growth Leverage
Private Credit Bureau Private Credit Bureau
Credit to GDP Coverage Credit to GDP Coverage
Size (log(ﬁrm’s -0.181∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
asset share)) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Interaction (Financial 0.016∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
Development × size) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Interaction (Mean -0.064∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ 0.002 0.030∗∗∗
growth ×size) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Interactions (industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
× size)
Interactions (age Yes Yes Yes Yes
group × size)
Interaction (log(GDP 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
per capita) × size) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Age
Adjusted 2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Number Observations 2568782 2568782 4564461 2568559
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